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sion's recommendations. Their dismissal of Government Code sections 50140-45
as "an anachronism in modem law" thus appears to have been premature and
ill-considered. A re-establishment of these provisions seems called for. They would
provide a source of relief particularly well fitted to the needs of a state faced
with the prospect of continued agitation over civil rights. The New York experi-
ence with the Harlem riots may.never be duplicated in California. But a national
effort as volatile as the civil rights movement always raises a great threat of
sudden misdirection and destructive consequences. Legislation designed to ease
the burden of such disturbances should not be dismissed lightly.
Emmett F. Harrington*
*Member, Second Year Class.
MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AND CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACIES
Mass demonstrations have become a frequently used method of gaining
the public's attention and coercing redress for social inequities. Some groups
using this method have gone beyond lawful demonstrations and centered their
demonstrations instead around an intentional mass violation of a law. These
violations disrupt the peace of the community and place an increased burden
on law enforcement agencies and the courts.' The crime intentionally com-
mitted is usually a misdemeanor. Recent demonstrators in California, for
example, have been charged with unlawful assembly, failure to disperse, trespass,
and disturbing the peace--all misdemeanor offenses punishable by a relatively
minor penalty s The penalty apparently does not deter repeated violations;
there seem to be many repeat violations.
4
' Specific instances of such illegal activities were seen in California in the San
Francisco demonstrations in April 1964 and the demonstrations at the University of
California at Berkeley in December 1964.
2 CAL. PF_. CODE §§ 407, 409, 602(j), 415 respectively. Amended complaint filed
in Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, April 1964, against persons
involved in demonstrations at the Cadillac Agency in San Francisco.
8 CAL. Pm. CODE § 17 provides that a misdemeanor is any crime not punishable
with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 408 (unlawful
assembly is a misdemeanor); 409 (failure to disperse is a misdemeanor); 602 (trespass
is a misdemeanor); 415 (disturbing the peace is a misdemeanor and punishable "by
fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than 90 days, or by both fine and imprisonment, or either, at the discretion of
the court").
4 Complaints were dismissed against 28 of the 91 demonstrators still awaiting trial
on the San Francisco demonstrations as these 28 were awaiting sentencing on their
convictions for participation in other demonstrations. Oakland Tribune, Feb. 18, 1965,
p. 2, col. 2.
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The purpose of this note is to explore the possibility of convicting unlawful
demonstrators of criminal conspiracy and the possible effect of such a conviction
as a law enforcement tool. The discussion will be confined to situations where
the violation is of a constitutionally valid law and will not attempt to include
those cases where the law violated is constitutionally defective.5 Demonstrations
which violate no criminal law, e.g. orderly picketing, will not be discussed.
A criminal conspiracy has been defined as an agreement between two or
more persons to achieve an unlawful object, or to achieve a lawful object by
unlawful means.6 This common-law definition explicitly requires an agreement,
two or more parties, and a specific intent both to commit an unlawful act and
to combine with another for that purpose.7 Furthermore, the California statutes
governing conspiracies enumerate the illegal objectives which provide a basis
for the conspiracy charge,8 and require proof of an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy.9 It is submitted that mass demonstrations conducted with the
intent to breach a law in aid of the purpose of the demonstration are within
both the reason'0 and the letter of the law proscribing criminal conspiracies.
In some of the mass demonstrations, the agreement to violate the law is express,
there is well over the minimum requisite of two persons, and the specific intent
requirement is fulfilled-often proof of intent is aided by express, pre-announced
statements by the participants. The overt acts necessary as proof of the con-
spiracy in California are generally not concealed, since these acts help attain
the publicity sought by the demonstrators for their cause.
Under the express provisions of the California statute governing conspiracies,
the unlawful demonstrations seem to fall within the purview of two subdivisions
of section 182. Subdivision one makes an agreement to commit a crime a con-
spiracy. 11 Demonstrators gathering to commit a misdemeanor would clearly
fall within this category.12 In addition, subdivision five of section 182 makes
an agreement '"to commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals,
or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws" a
5 For cases involving void statutes see Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
6 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); Marino v. United States,
91 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 (1938).
7 See generally PER=Ns, CiNr. LAw 527-49 (1957).
8 CAL'. PEN. CODE § 182 lists the illegal objectives.
9 "No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside such agreement,
be done within this State to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to
such agreement and the trial of cases of conspiracy may be had in any county in which
any such act be done." CAL. PEN. CODE § 184.
10 The rationale for the criminal conspiracy charge is that "the social menace of
numerous individuals combined to breach the laws is qualitatively greater than the
undeveloped intent of any one alone." King, The Control of Organized Grime in
America, 4 STAN. L. REv. 52, 60 (1951).
11 "If two or more persons conspire: 1. To commit any crime...." CAL. PEN.
CODE § 182.
12 E.g., Globe Dairy Lunch v. Joint Culinary Workers, 117 Cal. App. 2d 190, 255
P.2d 94 (1953) (civil conspiracy); People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. Supp. 763,
1 P.2d 64 (1931) (dictum) (although defendants cannot be convicted of conspiracy
unless charged with the same, proof of such conspiracy is admissible on the trial of a
conspirator charged with a crime committed in furtherance of that conspiracy).
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criminal conspiracy. It is possible that demonstrators whose concerted actions
lead to mass arrests, followed by large numbers of trials, involving great cost
and delay in the judicial system, are also guilty of violations of this provision.
When the avowed purpose is to obtain publicity by clogging -the courts, the
participants are clearly guilty of a conspiracy to do an act injurious to the
administration of justice. Thus, the demonstrators would seem to fall within
the California law of conspiracy, and there is some case authority which would
indicate such a holding.'
3
While the illegal demonstrators in California have not been tried for criminal
conspiracies, it would seem clear that they could be. By use of the conspiracy
charge, law and order within the community could be better maintained.
Initially, arrest on charges of criminal conspiracy would allow the enforce-
ment agency to prevent disorder and damage to property before they occur.
Under the present use of trespass and disturbing the peace charges, each and
every person involved in the demonstration must commit an overt criminal
act. Allowing this increases the length of the demonstration and thus increases
the danger -to both life and property. A conspiracy at common law occurred as
soon as the agreement was made.14 In California, as mentioned above, there is
a statutory provision' 5 requiring an overt act in pursuance of the purpose of
the conspiracy, but this is only to insure the conspiracy was committed, and
circumstantial evidence is sufficient.16 This overt act need not be committed
by each member, and the act of one may be attributed to all the other partici-
pants.' 7 Thus, if a conspiracy is charged there is no need to wait for all the
participants to commit the planned acts before arrests are made. Earlier inter-
vention would prevent the additional disturbances and dangers that always
accompany mass demonstrations, and would allow more effective law enforce-
ment. Greater protection could be afforded those directly or indirectly affected
by the demonstrations.
The early intervention of effective law enforcement would be particularly
useful where demonstration leaders advocating violent action are involved.
Because conspiracy is an offense separate and distinct from the criminal
object of the agreement, 18 attendance at a preparatory group meeting to plan
an unlawful demonstration would satisfy the requirements of conspiracy. De-
pending on the gravity of the planned action, law enforcement agencies could
take effective action at any time from the first preparatory meeting to the actual
demonstration itself. In the past, the demonstrations in California have been
of a non-violent nature. Where objectives are non-violent crimes, early inter-
vention at the planning stage is not such a necessity as in situations where
violence is the objective. But if arrests were made at the preparatory stage
'3 Tbid.
14 PnMUIs, CRMMAx LAw 531 (1957).
15 CAL. Px.. CODE § 184.
t6Cf. People v. McKinney, 218 Cal. App. 2d 174, 32 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1963);
People v. Cummings, 173 Cal. App. 2d 721, 343 P.2d 944 (1959).
17People v. Garcia, 187 Cal. App. 2d 93, 9 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960); People v.
Kefry, 166 Cal. App. 2d 179, 332 P.2d 848 (1958).
18 People v. Augusto, 193 Cal. App. 2d 253, 14 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1961); People
v. Campbell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 262, 281 P.2d 912 (1955).
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rather than at the time of the planned unlawful disturbance itself, the group's
objectives of illegal intimidation and coercion would not be accomplished.
Another beneficial effect of applying the law of conspiracy to unlawful
demonstrations lies in the deterrent effect of more severe penalties. According
to the California statute, a conspiracy is punishable by a variety of penalties,
depending on the type of conspiracy involved.1 9 Since the penalty for some of
the violations herein considered can be a State prison sentence, a conspiracy
conviction could be a felony conviction. 20 This seems to be within the discretion
of the sentencing judge, and provision is made for county jail sentences, which
would be misdemeanor convictions.2 ' Thus, instead of punishing the demonstra-
tors for committing misdemeanors, the courts could convict them of felonies
on a conspiracy charge, with the attendant higher penalties. Illegal mass
demonstrations are composed of those who are leaders, planning and organizing
activities, and those who, because they believe in the cause, follow even to the
point of risking misdemeanor convictions. The effect of possible felony convic-
tions as a deterrent is yet to be determined, but simple logic would seem to
indicate that, at least in regard to the latter group, the risk of a felony conviction
will give rise to a moment of contemplation that is perhaps now lacking.22 The
seriousness of possible felony convictions would forcefully remind the potential
unlawful demonstrators of the quality and nature of the act they are about to
commit. The sanctions of law applied to a convicted felon are many and
harsh. In addition to the initial confinement in the State prison, the felon may
be disqualified as a juror,23 give his spouse grounds for divorce,24 and may
have severe restrictions placed on his liberty even after he is paroled.25 The
informal penalties, such as loss of job, education, and respect would also be
compelling reasons for second thought on the part of the potential unlawful
demonstrators. Consideration of these possible consequences could restrain the
demonstrators from violation of constitutionally valid laws as a method of
obtaining redress for the social injustices of which they complain.
The fact that criminal conspiracy has not yet been used in California demon-
strations is due, at least in part, to the awareness of prosecutors of the harsh con-
sequences described above. In every unlawful mass demonstration there are many
participants who do not deserve the stigma of a felony conviction. But where
19 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 182.
20 "A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the
state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor. When a crime, punishable by imprison-
ment in the state prison, is also punishable by fine or imprisonment in a county jail,
in the discretion of the court, it shall be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes after
a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison...."
CAL. Pm. CODE § 17.
l"When they conspire to do any of the other acts described in this section they
shall be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year,
or in the state prison for not more than three years, or by a fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both." CAL. Pr. CoDE § 182.
22 It is not within the scope of this paper to determine the deterrent effect of
felony convictions upon habitual criminal offenders.23 CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 11; CAL. PEN. CoDE: § 1072.
24 CAL. Crv. CoDE § 92(6).
25 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3052-53, 3056, 3059.
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there is continued use of unlawful demonstrations and where the same individ-
uals continue to initiate and incite unlawful action, there must be more
adequate and effective methods of legal control. Use of the criminal conspiracy
charge allows the prosecutor -to intervene at an earlier stage and affords a
stronger weapon against repeated violations and violators. As the statute
allows penalties to range from imprisonment in the county jail to incarceration
in -the State prison,26 the stigma of a felony conviction need not fall indis-
criminately upon all participants.
Another reason the criminal conspiracy charge has not been used in mass
demonstrations is the alertness of the prosecutor to the centuries-long criti-
cism of the crime.2 7 The criticism, which appears at first to be purely academic,
28
is seen on further observation to have had a genuine effect on the practical
application of the law of criminal conspiracy 29 Reversals of convictions for
conspiracy have been accompanied by opinions denouncing the sprawling and
dragnet effect of the conspiracy charge8 0 It must be noted, however, -that most
of this criticism arose during a period in our history when both the state and
federal governments were maldng extensive use of criminal conspiracy to cover
illegal activities inadequately covered by other statutes.3 1 It should also be
noted that the criticism is primarily aimed at common-law conspiracy8
2
Criminal conspiracy in California appears to have escaped such criticism.
Penal Code provisions furnish the limitations missing at common law.3 3 As
the statutory definition of -the offense has undergone only minor changes since
its introduction into California law, it would seem that the statute has had
satisfactory application. 4 The California criminal conspiracy statute provides
a most effective tool for law enforcement where masses of demonstrators violate
valid laws.
While the ends the demonstrators are seeking may be just and lawful, their
means in these instances are not. The law should be enforced in such a manner
as to prevent injury to the rights of the majority by groups attempting to obtain
26Note 21 supra.
27See Hamo, Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure in
the Last Century, 42 J. Crum. L., C. & P.S. 427, 437 (1951); Sayre, Criminal CoL
spiracy, 35 HXv. L. Rxv. 393 (1922); Comment, Developments in the Law of Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HAv. L. REv. 920 (1959); Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy-
Inadequacies of State Law, 68 HAiRv. L. REv. 1056 (1955).
28 Ibid.
2 9 See, e.g., Recommendation of Senior Circuit Judges, 1925 ATr'y Gxr. ANN.
REP. 5-6.
3 0E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (concurring
opinion); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
B1 Hamo, Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure in the
Last Century, 42 J. Cin. L., C. & P.S. 427, 438 (1951). For cases illustrating the
use of the conspiracy charge by the federal government see King, The Control of
Organized Crime in America, 4 STAN. L. REv. 52, 64-65 n.77, 66 n.86 (1951).
32 E.g., Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy-Inadequacies of State Law,
68 HARv. L. lRv. 1056 (1955).
83 Id. at 1068 n.113 (distinguishing conspiracy in California).
S4 For history of amendments see WEsT's ANN. CAL. P~m. CoDE § 182. The con-
stitutionality of the law is well settled, People v. Henderson, 120 Cal. App. 2d 50, 53,
260 P.2d 639, 640 (1953).
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